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I.   INTRODUCTION
Telecommunications in the United States is a $700 billion in-
dustry that comprises approximately one-sixth of our nation’s
economy.1 A subset of this industry is the $90 billion local tele-
phone exchange market.2 Until recently, this enormously profit-
able market operated as a natural monopoly3 in which a small
                                                                                                             
* 1996 Florida State University Law Review Ausley Scholarship paper.
** The author thanks Mr. Dubose Ausley for his financial support. This Comment is
dedicated to the memory of the author’s father, Dr. William O. Hughes.
1. Michael E. Kanell, New Era of Telecommunications: Who’ll Survive Storm of
Competition?, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 11, 1996, at F5.
2. Leo Rennert, Clinton Dials in New Era, Signs Telecom Bill, Touts Services, Jobs,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 9, 1996, at A1.
3. A natural monopoly is “[o]ne which is created from circumstances over which the
monopolist has no power. For example, a market for a particular product may be so limited
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number of regional telephone companies provided local exchange
services within exclusive territories.4 The federal government and
many states such as Florida endorsed this anti-competitive envi-
ronment.5 However, recent telecommunications reforms aim to
dismantle the local exchange monopoly.6 With the reforms, Con-
gress and the Florida Legislature hope to create a competitive local
exchange market in which hundreds of telecommunications com-
panies provide consumers with a broad array of advanced tele-
communications services at reasonable prices.7 This Comment ex-
plores whether the telecommunications reforms will successfully
achieve their goal.
This Comment provides the reader with a general understand-
ing of the telecommunications industry and the regulation of the
local exchange market. Part II describes the historical efforts of
the federal government and the Florida Legislature to control the
adverse effects of the local exchange monopoly. Part III depicts
the developments within the telecommunications industry that
influenced lawmakers to open the local exchange market to com-
petition. Part IV summarizes those provisions of the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 particular to the deregulation of the local
exchange market. Part V outlines the provisions of the 1995
Florida telecommunications reform that relate to local exchanges
and were not preempted by the federal Act. Part VI attempts to
predict the likely impact the federal and state reforms will have
on consumers, the telecommunications industry, and the local ex-
change market. Finally, part VII concludes that telecommunica-
tions reform will benefit consumers by bringing competition to
the local exchange market.
II.   THE TRADITION OF REGULATING TELECOMMUNICATIONS
MONOPOLY
A.   The History of Federal Regulation
On the national level, the history of the development of the tele-
communications industry has been one of continual tension be-
tween monopoly and competitive market structures. For decades,
                                                                                                             
that it is impossible to profitably produce such except by a single plant large enough to
supply the whole demand.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1007 (6th ed. 1990).
4. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 141 (D.D.C.
1982), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
5. See discussion infra part II.
6. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-403.
7. See sources cited supra note 6.
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each of the three branches of the federal government has battled
monopoly in the nationwide telecommunications industry. Con-
gress, federal courts, the Department of Justice, and the Federal
Communications Commission have participated in the campaign
to break down anti-consumer behavior. The federal government’s
confrontation with monopoly in the telecommunications industry
originated with the Communications Act of 1934.8 The following
section explores the federal regulation of telecommunications be-
fore the enactment of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
1.   The Communications Act of 1934
In 1934, Congress passed the Communications Act.9 The pur-
pose of the Act is to regulate interstate and international com-
munications to ensure the universal provision of communications
services.10 To achieve this purpose, the Act created the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC)11 and vested it with the
regulatory powers necessary to encourage uniform and construc-
tive growth within the telecommunications industry.12
Congress intended the FCC to serve as an independent expert
agency capable of regulating an increasingly complex and dynamic
industry.13 Accordingly, Congress granted the FCC broad jurisdic-
tion and regulatory authority over telephone and telegraph com-
panies, broadcasting, and telegraph communications.14 The FCC’s
jurisdiction does not extend to the regulation of many intrastate
communications services, however.15 For example, the Communi-
cations Act explicitly reserves regulatory control over intrastate
toll and local exchange telephone services to the states.16
                                                                                                             
8. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613
(1994)).
9. Id.
10. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
11. Id.
12. See Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652, 658 (D. Ohio
1968).
13. See American Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 191 F.2d 492, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994); see also United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.
157, 167-68 (1968). The broad jurisdiction of the FCC resulted from the consolidation of
various regulatory functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Radio
Commission, and the Postmaster General. See Robert B. Friedrich, Note, Regulatory and
Antitrust Implications of Emerging Competition in Local Access Telecommunications: How
Congress and the FCC Can Encourage Competition and Technological Progress in Tele-
communications, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 646, 648 (1995).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994). Congress did not intend the Communications Act to
preempt the field of state telecommunications regulations. Ceracche Television Corp. v.
Kelly, 364 N.Y.S.2d 276, 280 (Sup. Ct. 1974), aff’d, 376 N.Y.S.2d 217 (App. Div. 1975).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1994).
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2.   The Federal Courts
Federal courts maintain a vital role in the regulation of the
telecommunications industry. The courts’ predominant purpose is
to interpret telecommunications legislation and review the FCC’s
actions.17 Additionally, the courts have jurisdiction to resolve an-
titrust disputes filed by the Department of Justice against tele-
communications companies.18 These disputes frequently result in
the filing of consent decrees that require the courts to monitor the
parties’ compliance with the agreements.19 The two telecommuni-
cations antitrust decisions of greatest impact are the 1956 Con-
sent Decree and the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ); combined,
they destroyed the largest monopoly the world has ever known,
American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T).20
a.   The 1956 Consent Decree
In 1949, the Department of Justice filed an antitrust action in
federal district court in New Jersey against AT&T and its sub-
sidiary, Western Electric,21 for alleged violations of sections 1, 2,
and 3 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.22 The government alleged
“that [AT&T and Western Electric] had monopolized and con-
spired to restrain trade in the manufacture, distribution, sale,
and installation of telephones, telephone apparatus, equipment,
                                                                                                             
17. Patricia Diaz Dennis & Gary M. Epstein, Panel Discussion: The Future of Tele-
communications, in PRACTICING LAW INST., 12TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON TELECOMMU-
NICATIONS: POLICY AND REGULATION 1994 (Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. G4-3930) (Dec. 1994), available in WESTLAW, PLI
Database, at *93.
18. See id.; see also discussion infra parts II.A.2.a-b.
19. Friedrich, supra note 14, at 649.
20. Id. at 655. Before 1983, “[t]he combined operations of AT&T . . . exercised monop-
oly power over nearly every sector of the telecommunications industry within the United
States.” Id. In 1980, AT&T’s operating revenues equalled approximately two percent of the
country’s gross national product. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp.
131, 152 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
21. At the time of the lawsuit, Western Electric manufactured telecommunications
equipment exclusively for AT&T. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 135 n.3.
22. Id. at 135-36 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1-3). The purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890 is to pursue unimpeded competition as a means of advancing consumer prosperity:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic lib-
erty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the high-
est quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time provid-
ing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political
and social institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy
unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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materials, and supplies.”23 To combat the monopoly, the govern-
ment sought structural relief by completely divesting Western
Electric from AT&T.24
From 1949 to 1956, the case lay virtually dormant in the dis-
trict court.25 Meanwhile, AT&T exerted substantial influence in
Washington, D.C., to bring the action to a favorable conclusion.
AT&T enlisted the assistance of the Department of Defense to
persuade the Justice Department to postpone prosecution of the
suit and reduce the severity of the requested sanctions.26 Officers
from AT&T and the Defense Department repeatedly met with
Justice Department officials, eventually securing the pledge of
the Attorney General to conclude the case with no significant in-
jury to AT&T.27 By December 1955, the Justice Department and
AT&T had arrived at an agreement.28 The resulting consent de-
cree did not include any of the structural changes to AT&T that
the Justice Department had originally sought.29 Most impor-
tantly, AT&T did not have to divest Western Electric.30 Its mo-
nopoly escaped intact.
b.   The Modification of Final Judgment
During the 1960s and 1970s, Microwave Communications, Inc.
(MCI) and other companies attempted to compete with AT&T in
the long-distance and other telecommunications markets.31 Their
                                                                                                             
23. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 135.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 136. A number of AT&T executives were involved with national defense
projects and thus the Department of Defense assisted AT&T because it feared that prose-
cution of the case would impede the Korean War effort. Id. at 136 n.8.
27. Id. at 137. In 1959, the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary ap-
pointed the Antitrust Subcommittee to investigate the negotiation process that led to the
1956 Consent Decree. Id. at 136. The subcommittee reported that the willingness of the
Attorney General to forego the original goals of the antitrust action demonstrated
“partiality toward the defendants incompatible with the duties of his public office.” Id. at
137 n.11. The Antitrust Subcommittee also was dismayed by the unwillingness of the Jus-
tice Department to disclose information necessary for the investigation. The subcommittee
reported that the Justice Department’s defiance was the result of its “desire to cover up
those facts which the Department considered to be embarrassing.” Id. The Department’s
obstinacy forced the subcommittee to obtain the needed information from other sources. Id.
at 136-37.
28. Id. at 137.
29. Id. at 137-38. The consent decree imposed upon AT&T certain minimal line-of-
business restrictions that permitted the company to provide only telecommunications
services. Id. at 138.
30. Id. at 137. Through the district court’s ratification of the 1956 Consent Decree,
AT&T agreed to engage in only common carrier communications services, and Western
Electric agreed to manufacture equipment solely for use by AT&T. Id. at 138.
31. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY: YESTERDAY AND TODAY 5-9
(1994) (on file with the Florida Public Service Commission).
184 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:179
efforts culminated in a series of antitrust lawsuits charging
AT&T and its subsidiaries with unlawfully hindering competi-
tion.32 Although they resulted in modest victories for the various
petitioners, these actions never seriously threatened the core
AT&T monopoly.33
By the early 1970s, the government concluded that the 1956
Consent Decree had failed to facilitate meaningful competition
within the telecommunications industry.34 As a result, on Novem-
ber 20, 1974, the Justice Department filed a second antitrust
lawsuit against AT&T, Western Electric, and Bell Laboratories.35
For the second time, the government alleged that the defendants
had violated section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act through the
monopolization of a broad spectrum of telecommunications serv-
ices.36 The government sought the total divestiture of the Bell
Operating Companies (BOCs) from AT&T and the dissolution of
Western Electric.37
After extensive pretrial proceedings, discovery, and failed set-
tlement negotiations, the trial finally began on January 15, 1981,
before U.S. District Court Judge Harold Greene in the District of
Columbia.38 In January 1982, a proposed consent decree between
the parties was submitted to the court for its approval.39 Follow-
ing modification by Judge Greene, the consent decree was ap-
proved as a Modified Final Judgment (MFJ).40 In sum, the plan of
                                                                                                             
32. Id. The antitrust actions included the “Above 890” decision of 1959, Bendix Avia-
tion Corp. v. FCC, 272 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1959); the Carterphone decision of 1968, Car-
terphone v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968); the Specialized Common
Carrier decision of 1971, Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Appli-
cations to Provide Specialized Common Carrier Servs., 24 F.C.C.2d 318 (1970); and the Ex-
ecunet decision of 1975, M.C.I. Telecommunications Corp. v. F.C.C., 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978). PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N, supra note 31, at 7-9.
33. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N, supra note 31, at 5-11.
34. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 139.
35. See id. at 131.
36. Id. at 139.
37. Id. The 22 BOCs were wholly-owned subsidiaries of AT&T that provided local
telephone services throughout the United States. Id. at 139 n.19. By 1983, approximately
80 percent of the nation’s telephone subscribers received local and long-distance services
from AT&T and the BOCs. Marc W. Dunbar, Comment, Telecommunications Competition
in Florida: A Look at House Bill 1531, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 666-67 (1993).
38. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 139-40. The scope of the trial proceed-
ings was enormous. Id. at 140. The case was initially divided into 82 segments. Id. The
government presented over 250 witnesses and many thousands of pages of documents in
its case-in-chief. Id. The trial record contained over 24,000 pages of transcripts. Id.
39. Id. at 140.
40. Id. at 225. Judge Greene retained jurisdiction over the matter to enforce and
modify the MFJ and plan of reorganization. Id. at 231. The MFJ was reviewed triennially
to allow the regional Bell operating companies to seek entry into other telecommunications
markets. Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25, 27
(1995).
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reorganization that implemented the MFJ divested the twenty-
two BOCs from AT&T, prohibited AT&T from providing local ex-
change services, and banned the BOCs from specific lines of busi-
ness, including equipment manufacturing, long-distance services,
and information services.41 Thus, the 1982 MFJ granted the relief
the government had originally sought in 1949—structural
changes to AT&T necessary to defeat the company’s anti-
competitive grip on the telephone industry.
Judge Greene recognized that AT&T’s ability to monopolize
the telecommunications market was primarily grounded in its
exclusive control of local telephone services through the BOCs.42
The BOC networks—comprised of enormously expensive wires,
cables, switches, and transmission facilities—operated as
“bottlenecks” for the interconnection of telephone subscribers.43
The only means by which a telecommunications carrier could
provide services to homes and businesses was through BOC net-
work access, which AT&T controlled with a tight fist.44
Judge Greene wanted to terminate AT&T’s exclusive control
over access to the BOC networks, but he did not find competition
in the local exchange market a viable alternative.45 He thought
that the enormous capital costs of constructing local exchange
networks to compete with the existing BOC networks were a
prohibitive barrier to market entry for any potential local ex-
change competitors.46 Therefore, in lieu of competition, Judge
Greene ordered the divestiture of AT&T to sever the economically
unhealthy relationship between the monopolistic local exchange
services provided by the BOCs and the more competitive long-
distance services of AT&T.47
                                                                                                             
41. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 222-32.
42. Id. at 223.
43. Id.; see also Friedrich, supra note 14, at 659.
44. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 223; see also Friedrich, supra note 14, at
659 (describing BOC networks as “natural monopolies” because of prohibitively high capi-
tal costs necessary for market entry and rapidly declining average costs of operating net-
works in long-term). AT&T provided its long-distance competitors with more inferior and
costly connection to the BOCs than it saved for its subsidiaries. Spulber, supra note 40, at
29. This practice was known as “discriminatory access.” Id.
45. See American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 223.
46. Id.
47. Id. The MFJ mandated that divestiture of the BOCs from AT&T was to occur
through the following steps:
1. The transfer from AT&T and its affiliates to the BOCs . . . of sufficient fa-
cilities, personnel, systems, and rights to technical information to permit the
BOCs to perform, independently of AT&T, exchange telecommunications and
exchange access functions . . . ;
2. The separation within the BOCs of all facilities, personnel and books of ac-
count between those relating to the exchange telecommunications or exchange
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The MFJ authorized AT&T to provide services and equipment
in those telecommunications arenas Judge Greene found were
competitive.48 Accordingly, the MFJ eliminated the 1956 Consent
Decree restrictions that limited AT&T solely to the provision of
telecommunications services.49 Judge Greene found that allowing
a technologically advanced company like AT&T to compete in
arenas such as the computer and information markets would fur-
ther  the public interest.50
Pursuant to the MFJ, the twenty-two BOCs were either dis-
solved or consolidated into seven Regional Bell Operating Com-
panies (RBOCs)—Ameritech, BellSouth,51 Bell Atlantic, NYNEX,
Pacific Telesis, Southwestern Bell, and US West.52 The territories
of the RBOCs were geographically divided into 158 local access
transport areas (LATAs).53 LATAs defined the territory within
which only one local exchange carrier (LEC) was authorized to
operate.54 Thus, no RBOC or other LEC could provide inter-LATA
local exchange services.
                                                                                                             
access functions and those relating to other functions . . . provided that there
shall be no joint ownership of facilities, but appropriate provision may be made
for sharing, through leasing or otherwise, of multifunction facilities so long as
the separated portion of each BOC is ensured control over the exchange tele-
communications and exchange access functions;
3. The termination of the License Contracts between AT&T and the BOCs . . .
and the Standard Supply Contracts between Western Electric and the BOCs
and other subsidiaries; and
4. The transfer of ownership of the separated portions of the BOCs provid-
ing local exchange and exchange access services from AT&T by means of a
spin-off of stock of the separated BOCs to the shareholders of AT&T, or by
other disposition . . . .
Id. at 226-27.
48. Id. at 223. The MFJ sanctioned the broad provision of computer and information
services and equipment by AT&T with one exception: AT&T was precluded from participating
in electronic publishing until Judge Greene determined the field was competitive and inca-
pable of monopolization. Id. Judge Greene feared that allowing AT&T to participate in both
the transmission of information by providing telephone services and the generation of infor-
mation by providing electronic publishing services could lead to a news media monopoly. Id.
“Such a development would strike at a principle which lies at the heart of the First Amend-
ment: that the American people are entitled to a diversity of sources of information.” Id. at
223.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. BellSouth, the nation’s largest RBOC upon enactment of the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, provides local exchange services to Florida telephone subscribers through its subsidiary,
Southern Bell. Southern Bell provides service within seven LATAs. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Com.,
CS for SB 1554 (1995) Staff Analysis 2 (final May 18, 1995) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter Fla.
H.R. Staff Analysis]; Kanell, supra note 1, at F5 (describing size of BellSouth).
52. Spulber, supra note 40, at 27.
53. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 990, 1011, 1016, 1026-
27, 1035, 1048-49 (D.D.C. 1983) (LATA Opinion).
54. See id. at 993-94; see also United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 969 F.2d 1231, 1233 (D.C.
Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Ameritech Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 U.S. 951 (1993).
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The MFJ also prohibited the new RBOCs from engaging in the
telecommunications lines of business in which AT&T was
authorized to compete, namely information services, long-
distance services, and equipment manufacturing markets.55
Judge Greene imposed these line-of-business restrictions because
of the risk that the RBOCs would abuse the available competitive
advantages previously used by AT&T to gain a monopoly over
certain telecommunications services.56 As a result, the MFJ con-
fined the RBOCs to the provision of local exchange services, cus-
tomer premises equipment, telephone directories containing paid
advertisements, and other products and services related to their
natural monopolies.57
3.   The FCC Computer Inquiries
The FCC’s most significant contributions toward the regula-
tion of monopoly in the telecommunications industry came in the
form of three “computer inquiries.” The FCC initiated its inquir-
ies to determine which of the emerging services arising from the
combination of computer and telecommunication technologies
should be subject to government antitrust regulations.58 The con-
tinuing difficulty of deciding which of these combined services
must be regulated eventually contributed to the nearly total de-
regulation of the telecommunications industry.59
The FCC inquiries pursued the policy goal of “structural sepa-
ration,” through which communications companies were not to
avoid required regulation through the merger of regulated com-
munications services with unregulated data processing services.60
In In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Inte r-
dependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facil i-
                                                                                                             
55. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 224 (D.D.C. 1982),
aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
56. Id.
57. Id.; Dunbar, supra note 37, at 668.
58. See generally In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interde-
pendence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir.
1973) (First Computer Inquiry); In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s
Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980); In re Amend-
ment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer In-
quiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (Third Computer Inquiry I); In re Amendment of Sections
64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 2 F.C.C.R.
3072 (1987) (Third Computer Inquiry II).
59. See Fla. S. Comm. on Com., CS for SB 1554 (1995) Staff Analysis 1 (Apr. 6, 1995)
(on file with comm.) [hereinafter Florida Senate Staff Analysis].
60. PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N, supra note 31, at 9.
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ties (First Computer Inquiry ),61 the FCC determined that if the
“primary purpose” of a combined service was the provision of
communications, the service would be regulated.62 Fittingly, if the
primary purpose of the combined service was to provide data
processing, it would remain unregulated.63
In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules
and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry) 64 and the two orders
in In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules
and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry) 65 effectively abolished
the ruling of First Computer Inquiry  and pursued structural
separation by classifying combined telecommunications and data
processing services as either “basic” or “enhanced.”66 The FCC
regulated “basic services” because they concerned the simple
communication of information.67 For example, the FCC classified
the “plain old telephone service” (POTS) common carriers tradi-
tionally provided as a basic service.68 The FCC recognized that
POTS and other basic services were not available in competitive
markets and that regulation was necessary to control the adverse
impacts of monopoly.69 “Enhanced services” remained unregu-
lated, however, because they primarily concerned the use of data
processing applications available in competitive markets.70 Be-
cause the FCC determined that there was no danger of monopoly,
it did not restrict enhanced services; rather, the FCC authorized
any telecommunications company, including AT&T and the
RBOCs, to provide them.71
B.   The History of Florida Regulation
In 1913, the Florida Legislature vested the Florida Public
Service Commission (PSC) with exclusive regulatory authority
                                                                                                             
61. 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp.
v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).
62. Id. at 305.
63. Id.
64. 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980).
65. 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986); 2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987).
66. See Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 387; Third Computer Inquiry I, 104
F.C.C.2d at 968; Third Computer Inquiry II, 2 F.C.C.R. at 3074. Second Computer Inquiry
was decided before the MFJ, while Third Computer Inquiry I and Third Computer Inquiry
II were decided after the MFJ.
67. See Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 387; Third Computer Inquiry I, 104
F.C.C.2d at 968; Third Computer Inquiry II, 2 F.C.C.R. at 3074.
68. See Dunbar, supra note 37, at 670.
69. See id. at 671; PUBLIC SERV. COMM’N, supra note 31, at 9-10.
70. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 138 n.17 (D.D.C.
1982), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
71. See Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 420.
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over intrastate telecommunications services.72 The statutory
charge to the PSC is contained in chapter 364, Florida Statutes .
The Florida Legislature dramatically amended the scope and
purpose of chapter 364 during the 1995 Regular Session.73
Before 1995, the Florida Legislature controlled the adverse ef-
fects of the telecommunications monopoly through regulation
rather than competition. To provide local exchange services, the
Legislature authorized the PSC to grant virtual monopolies to
certain telecommunications companies.74 The companies awarded
the monopolies are known as “incumbent” LECs.75 Thirteen in-
cumbent LECs essentially controlled the entire Florida local ex-
change market.76 Florida law expressly prohibited cellular com-
munication systems, radio communications systems, and cable
television companies from providing local exchange services.77
The statute allowed the PSC to certify a nominal amount of com-
petition, however. Those “alternative” LECs authorized to com-
pete with the incumbent LECs were shared tenant service pro-
viders,78 alternative access vendors,79 and pay telephone provid-
ers.80
Before its recent amendment, chapter 364 controlled the prices
charged by the incumbent LEC monopolies through rate-of-return
regulation.81 The PSC established reasonable rates of return for
each incumbent LEC and subsequently set rates at levels that
enabled the companies to earn the targeted amounts.82 The PSC
                                                                                                             
72. 1914 Fla. Laws ch. 2, §§ 2829-2829z (codified as amended in scattered sections of
FLA. STAT. ch. 364); see also Florida Interexchange Carriers Ass’n v. Beard, 624 So. 2d 248,
251 (Fla. 1993).
73. See 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-403. For a discussion of the 1995 revision of chapter
364, Florida Statutes, see infra part V.
74. See FLA. STAT. ch. 364.01 (1993) (amended 1995).
75. Florida H.R. Staff Analysis, supra note 51, at 2.
76. Id. Incumbent LECs come in “large” and “small” varieties. The four large incum-
bent LECs are Southern Bell, GTE, Sprint United, and Sprint Centel. The nine small in-
cumbent LECs are ALLTEL, Florala, Gulf, Indiantown, Northeast, Quincy, St. Joseph,
Southland, and Vista-United. Id. at 7.
77. FLA. STAT. § 364.02(7) (1993) (amended 1995).
78. Id. § 364.339 (amended 1995). STS providers were limited to offering services to
commercial tenants located within a single building. Id.
79. Id. § 364.337(3) (amended 1995). AAVs were restricted to providing private line
service between a facility and its other buildings at separate locations. Id. These private lines
are colloquially known as “tie lines.”
80. Id. § 364.3375 (amended 1995).
81. See id. §§ 364.03-.3381 (amended 1995).
82. See Fla. H.R. Staff Analysis, supra note 51, at 2, 3; Florida Senate Staff Analysis,
supra note 59, at 2, 3; see also Charles W. Murphy, Public Service Commission Practice, 69
FLA. B.J. 30, 31 (1995) (describing required and recommended method of practice for util-
ity appearing before PSC); United Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Mayo, 345 So. 2d 648, 653 (Fla. 1977)
(holding that company’s rate of return cannot be so low as to confiscate its property, nor so
high as to be unreasonable).
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examined the incumbent LECs’ operating expenses and capital
investments in computing the appropriate rates.83 Once the PSC
had promulgated the rates, the incumbent LECs could not change
them without the express approval of the PSC.84
In 1990, in response to the national trend toward deregulating
the telecommunications industry, the Legislature significantly
amended chapter 364 to encourage competition within the local
exchange market.85 The Legislature instructed the PSC to
“[e]ncourage cost-effective technological innovation and competi-
tion[,] . . . [e]nsure that all providers of telecommunications serv-
ices are treated fairly, . . . [and] [r]ecognize the continuing emer-
gence of a competitive telecommunications environment through
the flexible regulatory treatment of competitive telecommunica-
tions services. . . .”86 To empower the PSC to achieve its com-
mand, the Legislature delegated to the commission the authority
to eliminate rate-of-return regulation and allow market condi-
tions to control prices when the PSC determined that effective
competition existed.87 Unfortunately, the PSC seldom employed
the alternative provisions and, despite the intent of the Legisla-
ture, the incumbent LEC monopolies continued to thrive.88
III.   THE CALL FOR REFORM
As discussed earlier, the MFJ’s divestiture of the BOCs from
AT&T was based upon the theory that a complete vertical sever-
ance of the companies’ business relationship would prevent
AT&T from monopolizing the various established and emerging
telecommunications markets.89 The MFJ allowed AT&T to com-
pete for long-distance and other competitive services while the
RBOCs and other LECs retained a monopoly over local exchange
services.90 However, a variety of post-divestiture developments
rendered the MFJ’s underlying logic hollow and raised the call for
deregulation of the entire telecommunications industry. These de-
velopments included the notable success of competition in the
long-distance market, the erosion of the RBOCs’ line-of-business
                                                                                                             
83. FLA. STAT. § 364.05 (1995).
84. FLA. STAT. § 364.035 (1993) (amended 1995).
85. See 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-244.
86. FLA. STAT. § 364.01(3)(c)-(e) (1993) (amended 1995).
87. Id. § 364.01 (amended 1995).
88. See Dunbar, supra note 37, at 682-91 (criticizing PSC’s inaction as contributing to
continued monopolization of local exchange services).
89. See discussion supra part II.A.2.b.
90. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 222-24 (D.D.C.
1982), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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restrictions, advancements in telecommunications technology, the
existence of potentially viable competition for local exchange serv-
ices, and the ability of regulators to ensure universal service and
consumer protection in a competitive local exchange environment.
A.   The Competition for Long-Distance Services
At the time of the divestiture, two major corporations and a host
of other telecommunications companies were primed to compete
against AT&T in the long-distance market.91 The ensuing battle
between AT&T, MCI, Sprint Corporation, and nearly 500 other
companies resulted in substantial benefits to consumers.92 These
benefits included a dramatic decline in long-distance rates and
technological advancements in the telecommunications infrastruc-
ture.93
The most recognizable benefit to consumers attributable to
competition was the initial decrease of approximately forty per-
cent in long-distance rates in the decade following divestiture.94
The fact that this decrease occurred concurrently with an in-
crease in consumer long-distance calls underscores the signifi-
cance of the statistic.95 Since 1992, however, basic rates have
slowly increased as AT&T, MCI, and Sprint have separated from
the other long-distance companies to capture ninety percent of
the market.96 Therefore, following a period of competition between
many companies, an effective oligopoly has come to dominate the
long-distance market. Congress believes that the infusion of new
competitors—namely the RBOCs and cable companies—into the
                                                                                                             
91. Joseph A. Pantoja, Desirable Economic Cooperation Among High-Technology In-
dustries: A Look at Telephone and Cable, 1994 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 617, 651 (1994).
92. Antitrust Issues in Telecommunications Legislation: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995) (statement of Howard H. Baker, U.S. Senator from Ten-
nessee) [hereinafter Baker Statement].
93. Michael Schrage, Let the Baby Bells Ring in Some Long-Distance Rivalry, WASH.
POST, Aug. 20, 1993, at B3 (describing decrease in long-distance basic rates); Dennis & Ep-
stein, supra note 17, at *44 (describing expensive advancements to telecommunications in-
frastructure).
94. Pantoja, supra note 91, at 651; Schrage, supra note 90, at B3. Senator Howard H.
Baker said the decrease in long-distance rates following divestiture was almost 70 percent.
Baker Statement, supra note 92.
95. See Schrage, supra note 93, at B3 (noting that “[p]eople are making more calls for
less money”).
96. Gautam Naik, Costs of Control: Long-Distance Rates, After Falling for Many
Years, Have Started Heading Higher, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1995, at R10. AT&T’s share of
the long-distance market is approximately 60 percent, MCI’s is about 20 percent, and
Sprint’s is roughly 10 percent. Id.
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long-distance market will again result in substantial benefits to
consumers.97
Consumers also will benefit because competition results in ex-
orbitantly expensive upgrades by the long-distance companies to
their telecommunication infrastructures.98 Indeed, the major
companies have invested billions of dollars in the installation of
all-digital and fiber-optic networks.99 These advanced networks
have the capacity to transmit voice, video, and data with amazing
clarity and speed.100 Consumers stand to benefit because these
systems pave the way to an information superhighway without
speed limits. Notably, consumer long-distance rates have contin-
ued to fall despite the remarkably high capital costs absorbed by
the competing long-distance companies.101
Congress noticed the effect competition had in the long-distance
market and wagered that the deregulation of the local exchange
market would result in analogous consumer benefits.102 As noted by
Senator Howard W. Baker, “[t]here is a big lesson in the long-
distance story—competition works and monopoly doesn’t.”103
B.   The Erosion of the RBOC Line-of-Business Restrictions
As previously discussed, the MFJ imposed three line-of-
business restrictions on the RBOCs.104 It prohibited the RBOCs
from providing long-distance services, manufacturing telecom-
munications equipment, and furnishing information services.105
The restrictions were premised upon the belief that the provision
of local exchange services was a natural monopoly, and that the
RBOCs and other LECs, as possessors of the monopoly, should
not be permitted to gain an unfair advantage in competitive mar-
kets by providing discriminatory access to the local networks.106
Although Judge Greene sanctioned the LEC monopolies, he also
recognized that, “over time, the Operating Companies will lose
                                                                                                             
97. See Baker Statement, supra note 92.
98. Dennis & Epstein, supra note 17, at *44.
99. Id.
100. See KEVIN MANEY, MEGAMEDIA SHAKEOUT 108-09 (1995).
101. Basic rates for long-distance service decreased from 1983 to 1991, while AT&T
began building fiber-optic networks in 1984. See Dennis & Epstein, supra note 17, at *44-
45 (discussing years of construction for advanced networks); Naik, supra note 96, at R10
(discussing years that long-distance rates began to increase).
102. See Baker Statement, supra note 92.
103. See id.
104. See discussion supra part II.A.2.b.
105. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 224 (D.D.C. 1982),
aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
106. Id.
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the ability to leverage their monopoly power into the competitive
markets from which they must now be barred.”107
The MFJ required a triennial review during which the RBOCs
could petition the court for modification of the line-of-business re-
strictions.108 These reviews resulted in endless litigation as the
RBOCs attempted to enter the restricted telecommunications
markets.109 Accordingly, the information services restriction
gradually eroded as the RBOCs demonstrated that there was no
substantial possibility they would or could use their monopoly
power to impede competition.110 During the first triennial review
in 1987, Judge Greene modified the restriction on the provision of
information services to allow the RBOCs to transmit information
generated by non-RBOC sources.111 In 1988, the court explained
that the ruling of the previous year allowed the RBOCs to provide
voice storage systems and the circuits needed for videotext systems
such as WESTLAW and LEXIS.112 Finally, in 1993, the court en-
tirely abolished the information services restriction and authorized
the RBOCs to provide such services on a fully competitive basis.113
The line-of-business restrictions regarding long-distance services
and the manufacture of telecommunications equipment continued to
survive.114 However, commentators called for the elimination of
these restrictions, arguing that advancements in technology and
the emergence of viable competition for local exchange services
were incongruous with the notion that the LECs were natural mo-
nopolies.115 Eventually, the elimination of the information services
restriction and the erosion of the natural monopoly rationale con-
tributed to Congress’s deregulation of local exchange services.116
C.   New Technologies and Viable Competition
The exclusive right to provide local exchange services given to
the RBOCs and other LECs by the MFJ was based partially upon
the theory that other telecommunications companies could not
                                                                                                             
107. Id. at 194.
108. Id. at 231.
109. Spulber, supra note 40, at 27.
110. See American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 224-25.
111. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 587 (D.D.C. 1987).
112. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 1, 22 (D.D.C. 1988).
113. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1578 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see
Spulber, supra note 40, at 227.
114. See Spulber, supra note 40, at 227.
115. See, e.g., id.; Friedrich, supra note 14, at 684-88; William J. Baumol & J. Gregory
Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1994).
116. See The Telecommunications Agreement, 104-8 CONG. Q. HOUSE ACTION REP. 3 (1996).
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replicate the local networks.117 Judge Greene theorized that the
enormous costs necessary to construct the local networks were an
all-powerful barrier to market entry for potential local exchange
competitors.118 Consequently, in lieu of competition, the MFJ
sanctioned government regulation of the local exchange monopo-
lies and authorized the LECs to charge fees to the various tele-
communications companies desiring access to homes and busi-
nesses.119
The concept that local exchange network construction costs
prohibited competition arose during a time when there was only
one telecommunications technology.120 The telecommunications
systems of the early 1980s consisted of twisted pairs of copper
wire for voice-grade transmissions, rudimentary central switch-
ing equipment, and basic customer premises equipment.121 To-
day’s technology has advanced to the point where there are nu-
merous forms of telecommunications systems that can facilitate
cost-effective competition for local exchange services.122
The copper wire networks used by the LECs for voice trans-
missions now appear completely incapable of meeting modern
society’s telecommunications demands.123 Today’s consumers re-
quire systems with the ability to rapidly send and receive voice,
data, and video transmissions.124 These needs can presently be
satisfied through a variety of technologies, including coaxial ca-
ble, fiber-optic cable, microwave, satellite, and cellular communi-
cations networks.125 Furthermore, modern digital switching
equipment can efficiently serve consumers’ interconnection needs
to a much greater extent than the LECs’ antiquated, centrally lo-
cated switching equipment.126
The myriad technologies presently possessed by potential local
exchange competitors offer a variety of means to avoid the LEC
network bottleneck. Potential competitors can use coaxial and fi-
                                                                                                             
117. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 223 (D.D.C.
1982), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 131.
120. Spulber, supra note 40, at 34-38.
121. Id. at 34-35.
122. See infra note 122 and accompanying text .
123. Spulber, supra note 40, at 35.
124. Id. at 35.
125. Id. The needs of modern consumers cannot be satisfied through a single best tele-
communications technology, but instead require an array of technologies. Id. Thus, the
competing telecommunications companies of the future will provide a variety of telecom-
munications services, as opposed to the traditional and rudimentary services of telephone,
television, and data. Id. at 35-36.
126. Id. at 35.
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ber-optic cable systems to “bypass” the local exchange net-
works.127 As of 1993, approximately ninety-one million homes
were wired with coaxial or fiber-optic cable lines as a means of
receiving cable television.128 In addition to basic voice-grade
transmissions, these lines permit the rapid, high-quality, two-
way transmission of data and video communications.129 With the
addition of modern switching equipment, cable operators such as
Tele-Communications Inc. (TCI), Comcast, and Time Warner
could effectively compete with the local exchange monopolies.130
Although the required switching equipment is expensive,131 cable
companies should nevertheless be able to offset the costs with re-
turns on their television services. Consequently, cable companies
will be in a position to compete efficiently with the LECs.
Another type of bypass technology is the alternative local fi-
ber-optic network employed by competitive access providers
(“CAPs”). CAPs, such as Teleport Communications and Metro-
politan Fiber Systems, construct their own local telephone infra-
structures in regions where the LEC networks already exist.132
The CAP networks allow consumers to avoid the LEC bottlenecks
by connecting directly to the networks of long-distance and other
telecommunications carriers.133 Because of the high capital costs
of building redundant local networks, CAPs achieve profits by
serving commercial facilities with high-volume communications
needs.134
                                                                                                             
127. Id. at 39; Dunbar, supra note 37, at 675-77.
128. Spulber, supra note 40, at 38. Cable television companies were originally humble
operations that were limited to providing community antenna television services (CATV).
Eric T. Werner, Something’s Gotta Give: Antitrust Consequences of Telephone Companies’
Entry into Cable Television, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 215, 217-18 (1991). In those early years,
the FCC feared that predatory telephone companies had the ability to monopolize the
emerging industry. Id. Accordingly, the FCC passed rules in the 1970s restricting tele-
phone companies from entering the market. Id. Congress later codified most of the FCC
rules as part of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat.
2779 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
129. Spulber, supra note 40, at 39. A coaxial cable modem hooked to a personal com-
puter can transmit data at a rate up to 1,000 times faster than a phone line. MANEY, supra
note 100, at 109.
130. Pantoja, supra note 91, at 650-57; Friedrich, supra note 14, at 674.
131. MANEY, supra note 100, at 108.
132. See Alexander C. Larson & Douglas R. Mudd, Collocation and Telecommunica-
tions Policy: A Fostering of Competition on the Merits?, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 265 n.5
(1993); Friedrich, supra note 14, at 675; Spulber, supra note 40, at 44; Dennis & Epstein,
supra note 17, at *46.
133. See Larson & Mudd, supra note 132; Friedrich, supra note 14, at 675; Spulber,
supra note 40, at 44; Dennis & Epstein, supra note 17, at *46.
134. Thus, the goal of the CAP is known as “cream skimming.” Larson & Mudd, supra
note 132, at 287-91.
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Finally, a variety of wireless networks allow consumers to
communicate directly with one another and avoid the wired LEC
networks.135 These wireless systems enjoy special advantages
over not only the LEC systems, but all wire-based systems. One
advantage of the wireless technologies (i.e., radio, cellular, mi-
crowave, and satellite telecommunications) is that they are
cheaper because their providers are not required to construct and
maintain extensive hard-wired systems.136 Additionally, wireless
technologies make communications portable.137
Two types of wireless technologies are cellular systems138 and
personal communications services (PCS).139 These technologies
provide mobile radio communications services that are not de-
pendent upon hardwire technologies.140 Both technologies com-
pete with the various broadcasting media for portions of the radio
frequency spectrum.141 Until recently, the scarcity of radio fre-
quencies allotted to the cellular and PCS networks by the FCC
resulted in higher prices for such telecommunications services.142
In 1993, however, the FCC set aside a larger portion of the radio
spectrum for wireless services and began auctioning the frequen-
cies.143 Upon completion of the auctions, cellular and PCS networks
                                                                                                             
135. See Friedrich, supra note 14, at 667-78; Spulber, supra note 40, at 40-41.
136. See Friedrich, supra note 14, at 673; Dunbar, supra note 37, at 677 n.89.
137. MANEY, supra note 100, at 53. “Portability” refers to the capability of consumers
to access telecommunications services anywhere and at all times, free from a wire-based
system. Id. The most fantastic example of a portable wireless telephone system is Mo-
torola’s proposed Iridium satellite phone system, which will “allow calls to be made from
absolutely anywhere in the world, even in the middle of the Sahara Desert.” Id. This sys-
tem will consist of 66 low-orbit satellites that possess the combined ability to convey a sig-
nal to any point on the globe. Id. Special antennae constructed around the earth will re-
ceive the satellites’ signals. Id. Thus, to complete the Iridium venture, Motorola will need
the consent and cooperation of the governments of hundreds of countries. Needless to say,
“Iridium is an unbelievably huge undertaking.” Id. at 294.
138. Cellular networks consist of a series of interlocking cells, each of which con-
tains one radio transceiver for telecommunications transmissions. Friedrich, supra note
14, at 662. Central switching services link these transceivers to wired telephone sys-
tems. Id. at 663 Thus, cellular technology is an extension of wire-based technology. Id.
at 663-64.
139. PCSs employ microcellular technology, which is less expensive than cellular tech-
nology but also less powerful. Id. at 671. PCS companies shoulder large capital costs to in-
stall their networks. Id. However, once a PCS network is in place, these capital costs rap-
idly decrease as the marginal costs of adding subscribers to a PCS network are signifi-
cantly lower than the costs of adding subscribers to the traditional local exchange network.
Id. at 672-73.
140. See Richard E. Wiley, The Telecommunications Act of 1995?, in PRACTICING LAW
INST., COMMUNICATIONS LAW: 1995 (Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property
Course Handbook Series No. G4-3945) (Nov. 1995), available in WESTLAW, PLI Database,
at *50-53.
141. Friedrich, supra note 14, at 662-63.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 671.
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will be able to provide telephone services to consumers at reduced
rates and will thus effectively compete with the LECs.144
Many commentators think that the efficient and convenient
wireless technologies will ultimately dominate telecommunica-
tions services as the hardwire networks find themselves unable
to meet consumer demands.145 Underscoring this belief is the fact
that wireless communication services had 15 million subscribers
in 1994, and are expected to have 80 million subscribers by 1997
and 145 million subscribers by 2002.146 One confident observer
believes that “[i]n the near future, wireless technology will be the
clear choice for local communications.”147
D.   Universal Service and Consumer Protection
The central purposes underlying the regulation of telecom-
munications historically have been the provision of universal
communications services and the protection of consumers.148 The
universal service policy goal ensures that consumers receive a
minimum level of telephone services at a reasonable price, re-
gardless of their location.149 Consumer protection policies guard
against unjust and discriminatory practices within the telecom-
munications industry.150 Mindful of the fundamental nature of each
of these policies, Congress amended the Communications Act to
require that any deregulation of the local exchange market pre-
serve the provision of universal service and the protection of con-
sumers.151
Before 1996, federal and state telecommunications regula-
tions funded universal service by subsidizing the LEC services
provided to rural and other economically undesirable areas.152 In
reforming the telecommunications laws, however, legislators
                                                                                                             
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Gail Garfield Schwartz & Jeffrey H. Hoagg, Virtual Divestiture: Struc-
tural Reform of an RHC, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 285, 294 (1992); Spulber, supra note 40, at
38-40; Friedrich, supra note 14, at 669-74.
146. Spulber, supra note 40, at 40.
147. Friedrich, supra note 14, at 674.
148. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1994); see also WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 109 F.2d 665, 671
(D.C. Cir. 1939) (holding that the policy of the Communications Act of 1934 is the public’s
protection).
149. Wiley, supra note 140, at *12.
150. MCI Comm. Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1087 (D. Ill. 1978).
151. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 458, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 130-34 (1996).
152. Dennis & Epstein, supra note 17, at *59. These subsidies commonly came in two
forms. First, the federal government allowed the LECs to charge fees the long-distance
companies seeking access to the local exchange network. Id. at *60. Second, state govern-
ments had the ability to allocate a portion of the costs of maintaining the local exchange
network to the long-distance companies operating within the state. Id. at *60-61.
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faced the problem of how to continue universal service in an era
of deregulation.153 To harmonize the seemingly incompatible goals
of deregulation and universal service, lawmakers proposed two
mechanisms. First, the contributions of all local exchange service
providers could create a “universal fund,” with the proceeds de-
livered to those companies operating in locations that require
subsidization.154 Second, Congress could require the LECs to re-
main in rural areas as carriers of last resort and authorize them
to charge other telecommunications companies with interconnec-
tion access fees.155
Before 1996, universal services consisted of single-line, voice-
grade telephone services, long-distance carrier connections, and
911 access.156 However, the advent of competition brings the
technological ability to provide consumers with a wide array of
telecommunications services.157 Thus, a second problem faced by
the lawmakers who desired to eliminate the LECs’ monopoly was
deciding what type of local exchange services must be provided
universally.158 One proposed solution was to allow the federal
and/or state governments to continually assess which telecom-
munications services could be provided universally and then
mandate the provision of such services.159
The deregulation of the local exchange market also prompted
lawmakers to consider additional consumer protection measures.
Some proposals placed disclosure requirements on the competing
telecommunications companies to facilitate the informed selection
of local exchange providers by consumers.160 Other proposals
mandated that companies supply to consumers general informa-
tion concerning the deregulation of the local exchange market.161
The latter measures were thought to be necessary because of the
                                                                                                             
153. Wiley, supra note 140, at *12; Dennis & Epstein, supra note 17, at *62.
154. Wiley, supra note 140, at *13; FLA. S. COMM. ON COM. & ECON. OPP., A REVIEW OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATION, 14-15 (1994) (on file with comm.)
[hereinafter TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATION].
155. TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATION, supra note 154, at 14.
156. Id. at 15; Dennis & Epstein, supra note 17, at *64-65.
157. Dennis & Epstein, supra note 17, at *65.
158. For example, should public policy dictate that LECs provide all consumers the
telecommunications technology necessary for the transmission of video, data, and interac-
tive services? Wiley, supra note 140, at *12.
159. Id. at *13 (stating that congressional proposals divided the task between federal
and state “joint boards”); TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATION, supra note
154, at 15 (recommending that the task be performed by state commissions).
160. TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATION, supra note 154, at 15.
161. Id.
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considerable confusion among consumers following deregulation
of the long-distance market in 1984.162
IV.   CONGRESS REACTS: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
Today our world is being remade . . . by an information revolu-
tion, changing the way we work, the way we live, the way we
relate to each other. Already the revolution is so profound that
it is changing the dominant economic model of the age. And al-
ready, thanks to the scientific and entrepreneurial genius of
American workers in this country, it has created vast, vast op-
portunities for us to grow and learn and enrich ourselves in
body and in spirit.
. . . But this revolution has been held back by outdated laws,
designed for a time when there was one phone company, three
TV networks, no such thing as a personal computer. Today,
with the stroke of a pen, our laws will catch up with our future.
We will help to create an open marketplace where competition
and innovation can move as quick as light.163
The call to reform telecommunications regulation resulted in
the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.164 This legis-
lation represents Congress’s first comprehensive revision of tele-
communications law since the passage of the Communications
Act of 1934. Congress generally intended the 1996 Act to stimu-
late further competition and technological advancements in the
telecommunications industry and to provide the public with a
greater variety of telecommunications services.165
The scope of the legislation is enormous. The Act abolishes the
legal obstructions that prevented the various telecommunications
companies from competing in other markets.166 It also eliminates
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163. President Bill Clinton, Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Telecommuni-
cations Act Conference Report of 1996 (Feb. 9, 1996). The signing ceremony was appropri-
ately located at the Library of Congress. Id.
164. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (to be codified in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.). The Act is the product of a conference agreement between the Senate and
the House of Representatives. The Senate passed its bill (S. 652) in June 1995, by a vote
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ing Rules on Phones and TV, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1995, at 1. President Clinton signed
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Communications Bill Signed, And the Battles Begin Anew, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1996, at
A1.
165. See 142 CONG. REC. E204 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Forbes); 142
CONG. REC. S686, S686-87 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Pressler); 142 CONG.
REC. S1172 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lott).
166. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 251-61 (West Supp. 1996).
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the remaining line-of-business restrictions that precluded RBOCs
from providing long-distance services and manufacturing tele-
communications equipment.167 The legislation deregulates the
cable television industry168 and removes all restrictions relating to
the ownership of television and radio stations.169 It censors ob-
scenity and violence on television and computer networks.170 Fur-
thermore, the Act abolishes all consent decrees regarding the
regulation of telecommunications, including the MFJ.171 Finally,
the Act preempts all state and local laws that impede the congres-
sional goal of competition in the telecommunications industry.172
This Comment explores only those provisions of the Act which
implicate the breakdown of the local exchange monopolies. The
Act generally seeks to foster local exchange competition by re-
quiring the incumbent LECs to allow competing alternative LECs
to use to their networks173 and prohibiting state and local gov-
ernments from inhibiting competition.174 The following section
will detail the Act’s equal access requirements, the measures that
ensure continued provision of universal service, the abolition of
the MFJ, and the preemption of state and local regulations that
operate as barriers to market entry.
A.   Equal Access Requirements
To facilitate competition for all telecommunications services,
the Act imposes a general duty of network interconnection upon
telecommunications carriers.175 Carriers must provide this net-
work interconnection on a nondiscriminatory basis and may not
impose features that would inhibit the seamless transmission of
                                                                                                             
167. Id. §§ 271-74. The line-of-business restrictions that bar the incumbent LECs from
providing long-distance services and equipment manufacturing are continued until actual
competition is present within the local exchange. Id.
168. Id. § 521-573.
169. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 110-112 (1996) (uncodified directive to FCC to
amend their broadcasting regulations).
170. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 223, 303. (West Supp. 1996). This Comment does not explore the
Act’s patent infringement upon the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First
Amendment. See American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (preliminarily enjoining Department of Justice from enforcing sections 223(a)(1)(B),
223(a)(2), and 223(d)(1)-(2) of Act).
171. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 143-144 (1996) (uncodified elimination of vari-
ous consent devices).
172. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253 (West Supp. 1996).
173. Id. § 251.
174. Id. § 253.
175. Id. § 251(a)(1). Essentially, “interconnect” refers to the interface of telecommuni-
cations systems.
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information across networks.176 The Act authorizes the FCC to
promulgate rules to effectuate “coordinated network planning.”177
The Act also imposes certain pro-consumer requirements upon
all LECs.178 Coincident to the provision of telecommunications
services, local carriers must ensure “number portability.”179 Num-
ber portability refers to the ability of consumers to change their
carrier while retaining their unique telecommunications identi-
fier (i.e., telephone number).180 The local carriers also must pro-
vide “dialing parity,” which ensures that the customers of compet-
ing alternative LECs are not required to dial more numbers to
access other telecommunication networks than the customers of
the incumbent LECs.181
Additionally, all LECs must meet certain minimum require-
ments designed to advance local exchange competition. First, lo-
cal carriers must provide their services for “resale” to competing
carriers.182 This measure allows the competing carriers to pur-
chase bundled or consolidated telephone services at wholesale
prices and resell them to individual customers at retail rates.183
The local carriers must provide equal access to competing carriers
that need the use of the local carrier’s poles, ducts, conduits, and
rights-of-way to connect with the existing local network.184 Fi-
nally, the competing carriers must provide “reciprocal compensa-
tion” agreements with local carriers to ferry and terminate tele-
communications traffic.185
The Act places additional requirements solely upon incumbent
LECs. Congress designed these measures to prevent incumbent
LECs from engaging in anti-competitive practices.186 An incum-
bent LEC must allow the nondiscriminatory interconnection of an
alternative LEC’s equipment and facilities to the existing local
exchange network at reasonable rates.187 Furthermore, an incum-
                                                                                                             
176. Id. §§ 251(a)(2), 256(a).
177. Id. § 256(b).
178. Id. §§ 251(b)-(c).
179. Id. § 251(b)(2).
180. Id. § 153(30).
181. Id. §§ 251(b)(3), 153(15).
182. Id. § 251(b)(1).
183. See id. § 251(c)(4) (explaining analogous resale requirement placed specifically
upon incumbent LECs). For example, an alternative LEC can purchase switching services
from the incumbent LEC and resell those services to its customers. This facilitates compe-
tition by enabling the alternative LEC to provide switched-access services such as call-
waiting without having to purchase multi-million dollar switching equipment.
184. Id. § 251(b)(4).
185. Id. § 251(b)(5).
186. See Wiley, supra note 140, at *10-12.
187. 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(g) (West Supp. 1996).
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bent LEC must permit an alternative LEC to physically
“collocate” its equipment directly on the premises of the incum-
bent LEC’s central office at a reasonable rate.188 If physical collo-
cation is not feasible, a state commission may authorize the
“virtual” collocation of an alternative LEC’s equipment at some
other locale.189 Finally, an incumbent LEC must offer an alterna-
tive LEC access to individual or “unbundled” telephone services
on reasonable, nondiscriminatory terms and conditions.190
B.   Universal Services
As previously stated, the goal of universal service has histori-
cally been to ensure that consumers are not denied certain basic
telephone services merely because they live in areas deemed by
the telecommunications companies to be economically undesir-
able.191 The deregulation of the telecommunications industry and
the ostensible end of government mandates complicated the
achievement of this policy goal.192 Which services should be pro-
vided universally? How should Congress guarantee universal
service in a deregulated environment? Who should pay for the
provision of services to those locations where profits cannot be
earned? Congress addressed these questions in section 254 of the
1996 Act.193
Recognizing the dynamic nature of the telecommunications in-
dustry, the Act defines universal service as “an evolving level of
telecommunications services that the Commission shall establish
periodically . . . taking into account advances in telecommunica-
tions and information technologies and services.”194 In delineating
the services to be provided universally, the FCC must consider
four factors beyond the widespread availability of basic telephone
services: (1) the extent to which telecommunications services are
integral to public education, health, or safety;195 (2) the range of
services that are provided to a majority of residential consum-
                                                                                                             
188. Id. § 251(c)(6).
189. Id.
190. Id. § 251(c)(3).
191. See discussion supra part III.D.
192. Id.
193. 47 U.S.C.A. § 254 (West Supp. 1996).
194. Id. § 254(c)(1). FCC Commissioner Andrew Barrett suggested that the industry
costs associated with such an expansive definition of universal service could be onerous.
FCC Launches Universal Service Joint Board, Rulemaking Proceeding, COMM. TODAY,
Mar. 11, 1996, available in WESTLAW, COMTD Database, at *3.
195. 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(c)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1996).
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ers;196 (3) the range of services offered by the various telecommu-
nications carriers;197 and (4) the extent to which telecommunica-
tions services can serve society’s interests, convenience, and
needs.198
Instead of enacting express mandates to provide universal
services, Congress created the “Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service” (Joint Board) to work with the FCC in study-
ing the attendant issues.199 The Act charges the Joint Board with
considering public comment on the implementation of the univer-
sal services goals and proposing recommendations to the FCC to
promulgate by rule.200 The Act also outlines various consumer
protection principles that must be incorporated into the FCC’s
universal service rules.201 These principles include the provision
of services at reasonable rates,202 nondiscriminatory universal ac-
cess to advanced services in all locations,203 and such other con-
sumer protection principles as the Joint Board and FCC deem
necessary.204 In summing up the goals of the Joint Board, FCC
Chairman Reed Hundt stated that success “will be measured by
whether, five years from now, American citizens . . . have a
greater choice of communications providers and services than
ever before.”205
C.   The Abolition of the AT&T Consent Decree
Statutory amendment could not, in itself, achieve true compe-
tition for local exchange services. It was necessary that any re-
forms also address enduring judicial pronouncements. Thus, to be
successful, the reforms needed to effectively eliminate the MFJ
maintained by the federal district court in the District of Colum-
bia. This was a dangerous task. If Congress classified the MFJ as
a final judgment, it would risk unconstitutionally encroaching
upon the power of the judiciary if it eliminated the order’s retro-
                                                                                                             
196. Id. § 254(c)(1)(B).
197. Id. § 254(c)(1)(C).
198. Id. § 254(c)(1)(D).
199. Id. § 254(a).
200. Id.
201. Id. § 254(b).
202. Id. § 254(b)(1).
203. Id. § 254(b)(2)-(4).
204. Id. § 254(b)(7).
205. Hundt Seeks State Input on Universal Service Notice, WASH. TELECOM NEWS,
Mar. 4, 1996, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database, at *2.
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active effect.206 If Congress determined that the MFJ was a con-
tinuing injunction, however, it could constitutionally eliminate
the order’s prospective effect.207
Therefore, to prevent the MFJ from hindering the goals of tele-
communications reform, Congress demonstrated its belief that the
MFJ was an injunction rather than a final judgment by referring to
it throughout the Act as the “AT&T Consent Decree.”208 As an in-
junction, Congress eliminated only the prospective impact of the
MFJ, thus avoiding any potential constitutional problems.209
Eventually, Judge Greene gladly abolished the retroactive impact
of the MFJ upon motions by the Department of Justice and the
seven RBOCs.210
D.   Preemption
The final means by which Congress encouraged competition
for local exchange services concern the express preemption of re-
strictive state laws.211 Before passage of the Act, approximately
half of the states maintained laws that strictly forbade any com-
petition for local exchange services.212 These obstructive laws are
now preempted. The Act provides that no state or local law may
prevent any entity from providing local telephone services.213
However, the Act preserves the ability of states to enact laws that
ensure, among other things, the provision of universal services,
the protection of the public welfare, and the preservation of the
quality of telecommunications services.214 Additionally, state and
local governments may continue to manage access and compen-
sation issues related to public rights-of-way.215
                                                                                                             
206. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 458, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 198 (1996) (citing Plaut v. Spend-
thrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995)).
207. Id. (citing Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992)).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 91.
210. See DOJ and Bells Agree MFJ is Moot; Fight Over Documents Begins, COMM.
TODAY, Mar. 1, 1996, available in WESTLAW, COMTD Database, at *1. Judge Greene re-
portedly supports the federal Act and believes it will successfully bring competition to local
exchange and long-distance markets. However, he fears that the recent avalanche of
mergers and acquisitions in the telecommunications industry could result in a monopolis-
tic concentration of ownership. Ma Bell Judge Backs Telecommunications Bill, NEWSDAY,
Feb. 18, 1996, at 5.
211. Congress did not intend for the Act to preempt implicitly any federal, state, or lo-
cal regulations. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 458, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1996).
212. See The Telecommunications Agreement, 104-8 CONG. Q. HOUSE ACTION REP. 8 (1996).
213. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(a) (West Supp. 1996).
214. See id. § 253(b); see also id. § 254(f) (describing the ability of states to promulgate
universal service regulations); id. § 253(b) (describing the ability of states to impose regu-
lations concerning quality of service and consumer protection).
215. Id. § 253(c).
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The Act does not specifically describe which types of state or
local law risk preemption. Instead, Congress authorized the FCC
to identify and suspend the enforcement of any state or local law
that hinders competition for local exchange services.216 Once
identified, the FCC will afford state or local governments notice
and an opportunity to respond before preemption.217 However,
some state officials are concerned that an aggressive use of the
preemptive power delegated to the FCC could stifle the ability of
states to facilitate competition and protect consumers.218 To ease
these concerns, FCC Chairman Reed Hundt assured the states
that the FCC will use its preemptive authority with restraint and
on a case-by-case basis.219
V.   THE LEFTOVERS: NONPREEMPTED FLORIDA
TELECOMMUNICATION REFORMS
Before Congress addressed the issue, the Florida Legislature
had answered the call to reform the regulation of the local ex-
change market.220 On June 17, 1995, a bill amending chapter 364,
Florida Statutes , became law without the signature of Governor
Lawton Chiles.221 The legislative intent of the Florida Act is to
encourage competition for local exchange services and streamline
government regulation.222 In general, the Florida Act seeks to
achieve these goals by authorizing the PSC to certify alternative
LECs to compete with incumbent LECs and allowing prices to be
regulated by market forces rather than the government.223
As previously discussed, certain express provisions of the fed-
eral Act preempt state law with respect to the regulation of local
exchange markets.224 For example, the Florida Act provides that
no alternative LEC may be certified by the PSC to compete with
                                                                                                             
216. Id. § 253(d).
217. Id.
218. Preemption Concerns Remain, But States View FCC Outreach as Sincere, COMM.
TODAY, Feb. 29, 1996, available in WESTLAW, COMTD Database, at *1.
219. Id.
220. See discussion supra part III.
221. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-403. This bill easily passed each house of the Florida Legisla-
ture. Vicki McCash, New Law Opens the Lines to Local Phone Competitors, FT. LAUD. SUN-
SENT., June 18, 1995, at 11A. Governor Chiles opposed the bill, fearing that it did not contain
enough consumer protection measures. Id.The Governor allowed the bill to become law with-
out his signature, however, because he believed the Legislature would override his veto. Id.
222. Fla. H.R. Staff Analysis, supra note 51, at 2. Upon enactment, Florida became one
of only nine states to open its local exchange market to competition. McCash, supra note
221, at 11A.
223. FLA. STAT. § 364.337 (1995) (alternative LEC certification section); id. § 364.051
(1995) (price regulation section).
224. See discussion supra part IV.D.
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a “small” incumbent LEC until January 1, 2001, unless the small
incumbent LEC elects price regulation or offers cable television
services.225 This provision is undoubtedly subject to preemption
by the FCC because the Florida law has “the effect of prohibiting
the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate
telecommunications service.”226 Aside from such an obvious ex-
ample, it unclear what other sections of the Florida Act may be
subject to preemption by the federal Act.227 The FCC will address
the preemption of perceived obstructive state laws on a case-by-
case basis.228
Should any provision of the Florida Act be preempted, a sever-
ability clause will prevent the invalidation of any nonpreempted
provisions.229 Moreover, the federal Act specifically states that
certain pro-consumer state laws will not be preempted.230 The
following section will discuss the various nonpreempted, pro-
consumer sections of the Florida Act.
A.   Universal Service
Congress created the Joint Board to study universal service is-
sues and make recommendations for the FCC to promulgate by
rule.231 In contrast, the Florida Legislature chose to codify specific
measures designed to ensure universal service.232 These measures
will not be subject to preemption if they are perceived by the FCC
to “preserve and advance universal service.”233
Like the federal Act, the Florida Act adopts a definition of uni-
versal service intended to evolve with technology and the extent
of competition within the local exchange market.234 Unlike the
federal Act, the Florida Act defines the scope of the basic services
to be provided universally. “Basic local telecommunications serv-
ice[s]” means the voice-grade transmission of local exchange
services, and access to long-distance services, emergency services
operator assistance, directory assistance, and a telephone number
directory.235 The Florida Act requires all LECs to supply such ba-
                                                                                                             
225. FLA. STAT. § 364.337(1) (1995).
226. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(a) (West Supp. 1996).
227. See discussion supra part IV.D.
228. See id.
229. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-403, § 37, at 3350.
230. See discussion supra part IV.D.
231. See discussion supra part IV.B.
232. FLA. STAT. § 364.025 (1995).
233. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(b) (West Supp. 1996).
234. FLA. STAT. § 364.025(1) (1995).
235. Id. § 364.02(2).
1996]                    TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM 207
sic services to any person within the LECs’ service areas during
the four years following enactment.236
The Florida Act authorizes the PSC to create a temporary
mechanism to fund the provision of universal service for four
years following enactment.237 Before the end of this period, the
Legislature will codify a permanent funding mechanism designed
to reasonably and equitably guarantee the provision of basic local
exchange services to the greatest number of consumers at a fair
price.238 Traditionally, consumers subsidized universal service.239
Florida law now requires the PSC’s temporary mechanism to en-
sure that alternative LECs contribute their “fair share” to this
subsidization.240 In creating a permanent funding mechanism, the
Legislature may opt to avoid the use of subsidies.241 If the Legis-
lature deems subsidies to be necessary, however, telecommuni-
cations service providers will supply the funds.242
B.   Consumer Protection
Opponents of the Florida Act believe the Legislature has failed
to adequately protect consumers from rapidly escalating rates and
unscrupulous business practices.243 The Legislature and other sup-
porters of the law argue that the Act will lower consumer rates,
improve customer service, and increase access to beneficial tech-
nology.244 Accordingly, Representative Scott Clemons, chairman of
the Florida House Committee on Telecommunications and Utili-
                                                                                                             
236. Id. § 364.025(1).
237. Id. § 364.025(2).
238. Id. § 364.025(4).
239. Fla. H.R. Staff Analysis, supra note 51, at 10.
240. FLA. STAT. § 364.025(2) (1995).
241. Id. § 364.025(4)(a).
242. Id. § 364.025(4)(d).
243. Opponents to the Florida Act include Attorney General Robert A. Butterworth,
the Public Service Commission, the Florida Consumer Action Network, the American As-
sociation of Retired Persons, and the Consumer Federation of America. See John Kennedy,
Phone Deregulation Rife with Uncertainty, ORLANDO SENT., Nov. 20, 1995, at 10
[hereinafter Kennedy, Phone Deregulation]; John Kennedy, Groups Oppose Phone Meas-
ure, ORLANDO SENT., May 19, 1995, at C3 [hereinafter Kennedy, Groups Oppose Phone
Measure]; Rene Stutzmand & Michael Griffin, Communications Bill Gets a Pass—The Law
is Expected to Give Floridians a Choice of Local Phone Service Providers, Better Service
and Lower Bills, ORLANDO SENT., June 17, 1995, at A10. Surprisingly, AT&T, soon to be
an alternative LEC, also opposed the Florida Act. McCash, supra note 221, at 11A. AT&T
believed the Act did not fully open the local exchange market to competition. Id. Their con-
cern now appears to be unwarranted because the preemptive federal Act goes further in
seeking a fully competitive market. See id.
244. See Kennedy, Groups Oppose Phone Measure, supra note 243, at 11A.
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ties, stated, “[p]oint by point, we addressed [the opponents’] issues .
. . [and] put in the strongest consumer protections of any state.”245
One method by which the Florida Act protects consumers is
through the capitation of basic local exchange service rates until
1999.246 The purpose of rate capitation is to protect consumers
from rapidly escalating prices by allowing local exchange compe-
tition the time necessary to emerge and establish efficient rate
levels.247 The basic rates for incumbent LECs that elected to be
subject to price regulation by January 1, 1996, are capped for
three years at the rate levels in effect on July 1, 1995.248 The in-
cumbent LECs that elect to be subject to price regulation after
January 1, 1996, will have the rates in place on that date frozen
until January 1, 1999.249 Finally, the rates of any incumbent LEC
owning over three million local service access lines will be capped
until January 1, 2001.250 Southern Bell is the only incumbent
LEC large enough to fall within the ambit of the last provision.251
The Florida Act instructs the PSC to analyze the extent to
which competition exist in the local exchange markets.252 Based
upon its analysis, the PSC must present to the Legislature by
December 1, 1997, an exchange-by-exchange recommendation on
whether there is a need to continue the capitation of rates.253 The
Legislature may then extend the rate caps an additional two
years or abolish them and impose an alternative means of ensur-
ing reasonable and affordable rates.254 Irrespective of this process,
an LEC may petition the PSC for a rate increase if that provider
believes a substantial change in circumstances justifies such an
action.255
Because multiple companies offering local exchange services
possibly may confuse the public,256 a second consumer protection
provision requires the PSC to establish a “consumer information
program.”257 This program apprises local exchange subscribers of
the availability of alternative providers, the rights of consumers
                                                                                                             
245. McCash, supra note 221, at 11A.
246. FLA. STAT. § 364.051(2) (1995).
247. See Fla. H.R. Staff Analysis, supra note 51, at 9.
248. FLA. STAT. § 364.051(2)(a) (1995).
249. Id. § 364.051(2)(b).
250. Id. § 364.051(2)(a).
251. See Fla. H.R. Staff Analysis, supra note 51, at 9.
252. FLA. STAT. § 364.051(3)(b) (1995).
253. Id. § 364.051(3)(a).
254. Id. § 364.051(3)(c).
255. Id. § 364.051(5)(c).
256. See discussion supra part III.D.
257. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-403, § 32, at 3348.
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under the new law, the role of the PSC in regulating the provi-
sion of local exchange services, and any other relevant informa-
tion.258 The consumer information likely will be disseminated in
the form of telephone bill inserts.259
The Florida Act offers an assortment of other consumer pro-
tections. Certain local exchange providers must provide a
“Lifeline Assistance Plan” to eligible consumers.260 Furthermore,
no LEC employee may intentionally disclose customer informa-
tion without customer authorization or a subpoena or court order
requiring such disclosure.261 Any employee who violates this pro-
vision commits a second-degree misdemeanor.262 Finally, the
Florida Act requires the PSC to submit annual reports to the
Legislature describing whether consumers are receiving quality
local exchange services at reasonable rates.263
VI.   THE FUTURE OF COMPETITION FOR LOCAL EXCHANGE
SERVICES
The enactment of federal and Florida telecommunications re-
forms have spurred a nationwide debate over the acts’ probable
outcomes. Supporters proclaim that the reforms will create com-
petitive markets, reduce prices for telecommunications services,
generate economic growth, encourage technological advance-
ments, and create high-wage jobs.264 Opponents fear the acts were
designed solely to benefit big business at the expense of consumer
protection.265
The central issue in the debate concerns the probable impact
upon consumers and the telecommunications industry of deregu-
lating the local exchange monopolies.266 Will consumers benefit
                                                                                                             
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. FLA. STAT. § 364.10(2) (1995).
261. Id. § 364.24(2).
262. Id.
263. Id. § 364.386(1)(d).
264. E.g., President Bill Clinton, Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 (Feb. 9, 1996); United States Representative Thomas J.
Bliley, Jr., Remarks on the Occasion of the President’s Signing of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 (Feb. 9, 1996); 142 CONG. REC. H1145-06, H1146 (daily ed. Feb. 1,
1996) (statement of Rep. Linder); 142 CONG. REC. S1172-01 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Lott).
265. E.g., Robert W. McChesney, Telecommunications Law: Corrupt, Disastrous, CAP.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at 1C; Eli M. Noam, Congress Sweeps it All Under One Big Top, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1996, at 9.
266. See, e.g., Kanell, supra note 1, at F5; McChesney, supra note 265, at 1C; Noam,
supra note 265, at 9; Robert Reno, Expect Some Potholes on the Road to Telecommunica-
210 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:179
from lower local exchange rates, an increased number of service
providers, and advanced beneficial services? Will the reforms re-
sult in the death of the local exchange monopoly and the birth of
true and sustained competition? Which companies will be the
most successful competitors in the local exchange market? Will
the federal and Florida acts require substantial amendment in
the future? Although the dynamic nature of the telecommunica-
tions industry makes predictions very difficult, the following sec-
tion analyzes these questions and attempts to provide answers.
A.   The Customer is King
The first noticeable impact of the federal and Florida telecom-
munications reforms will be a rush of competition by those com-
panies with the near-current ability to provide local exchange
services.267 This competition will result in lower rates and im-
pressive telecommunications packages as the various local ex-
change companies vie for subscribers.268 Many commentators ex-
pect the “cutthroat” competition to result in rate reductions of
twenty to fifty percent from 1996 to 1999.269 In the event the com-
petition does not result in rate reductions, the rate capitation
measures within the Florida Act will prevent the incumbent
LECs from raising prices until 1999.270
In addition to lowering their rates, competing companies will
bundle various telecommunications services and provide sub-
scribers with “one-stop shopping.”271 Consumers will have the
ability to receive all their telecommunications needs—including
local and long-distance telephone services, cellular services, cable
television, Internet access, and other on-line services—from a
single carrier.272 Moreover, the competing companies will package
                                                                                                             
tions Reform, MINN. STAR-TRIB., Feb. 19, 1996, at 12A; Edwin Yoder, Feeling Wary About
Telecommunications Act; GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Feb. 7, 1996, at A9.
267. See discussion infra part VI.B.
268. Neal Weinberg, Telco Managers Dial for Reform Dollars, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 5,
1996, at 1A; Katia Hetter, Dialing for Dollars Consumers Benefits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
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AT&T Boost in Local Phone Market, COURIER-NEWS, Feb. 9, 1996, at A1 (describing which cus-
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269. Weinberg, supra note 268, at 1A (quoting James Georgakis, assistant vice presi-
dent of NatWest Bank); Hetter, supra note 268, at 51; Turmelle, supra note 268, at A1.
270. See FLA. STAT. § 364.051(2) (1995).
271. Henry, supra note 268, at *1.
272. Hetter, supra note 268, at 51.
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these services economically to attract consumers.273 For example,
AT&T recently offered a bundled package of Internet and tele-
phone services, through which its current telephone subscribers
received five hours of free access to its WorldNet Internet serv-
ice.274 The carrier’s goal in offering such discounted bundled
services will be to create customer loyalty.275 One AT&T official
stated that “[t]here will be a range of offerings this industry has
never seen before . . . [a]s much or as little as the consumer
wants.”276 Clearly, the valued customer will be king.
B.   Survival of the Fittest
The competing local exchange companies will include long-
distance carriers, cable companies, and RBOCs willing to journey
into the once-forbidden territories of other LECs. Within only one
month of the enactment of the federal Act, AT&T submitted ap-
plications to all fifty state telecommunications commissions to
provide local exchange services in their respective states.277 Time
Warner Communications applied to provide local exchange serv-
ices throughout Ohio.278 Comcast developed plans to offer local
exchange services in Florida, California, and New Jersey.279 Bell-
South announced it will expand its operations in Orlando, Flor-
ida, to compete with Sprint United, an incumbent LEC.280 These
examples are only the beginning. Fostering competition for local
exchange services was the cornerstone of the federal and Florida
acts,281 and the legislation initially will achieve the desired effect.
Once a company such as AT&T or Comcast has received
authorization from a state commission to provide local telephone
services, most of the new alternative LECs will negotiate with
the incumbent LECs for interconnection and collocation with the
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existing local exchange network.282 Interconnection and colloca-
tion negotiations between the incumbent LECs and their com-
petitors promise to be highly contentious processes.283 The recent
legal reforms will not ameliorate the difficulty of these processes
because the federal Act merely requires incumbent LECs to ne-
gotiate in “good faith.”284 Congress left the specific legal mandates
to the FCC to promulgate by rule.285 However, no matter how ar-
duous the interconnection and collocation negotiations, they will
not prevent the onslaught of local exchange competition.286 There-
fore, incumbent LECs are likely to successfully complete the ne-
gotiations because the federal Act does not permit them to enter
the long-distance market until effective competition exists within
their local exchange territory.287
With the advent of local exchange competition, the telecom-
munications industry should experience an incredible era of con-
solidation, resulting in the birth of multi-billion dollar
“telecommunications supercarriers.”288 Two great rewards will
prompt acquisitions and mergers among the telecommunications
companies. First, consolidation will allow the supercarriers to of-
fer consumers an attractive and diversified package of telecom-
munications services.289 Second, the supercarriers will be able to
provide their new packages to the combined subscriber popula-
tions of the previously independent companies.290 Such rewards
already have influenced a series of high profile, multi-billion dol-
lar mergers. For example, US West, an RBOC, completed the
purchase of the nation’s third largest cable company, Continental
Cablevision, for $10.8 billion shortly after the federal Act was
signed into law.291 This acquisition gave US West the instant
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ability to provide a broad range of cable and telephone services to
13.9 million subscribers.292
Unfortunately, the deregulation of the local exchange market
may eventually result in an oligopoly of a small number of tele-
communications supercarriers.293 The competition for local tele-
phone subscribers will be so fierce, and the need to consolidate so
strong, that a Darwinian world where only the strongest tele-
communications entities survive may indeed become a reality.294
The deregulation of the telecommunications industry could there-
fore mirror that of the deregulated airline, banking, and long-
distance telephone industries.295 For example, airline deregula-
tion in the early 1980s eventually resulted in a major consolida-
tion of the industry and the death of once-successful companies
such as Eastern and Pan American Airlines.296 Additionally, the
deregulated long-distance market today is dominated by three
long-distance giants.297 This oligopoly will be the future of the lo-
cal exchange market without effective regulation by the FCC and
continuing oversight by Congress.298 One congressman, mindful of
his continuing duty, stated: “If instead of unleashing full blown
competition, [telecommunications deregulation] starts us on the
path of having seven monopolies dominate local and long-distance
service, we must intervene.”299
C.   Heirs to the Empire
The telecommunications companies that will emerge from the
initial burst of competition to inherit the local exchange market
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must possess certain competitive advantages over their rivals.
First, the companies must have respected reputations and well-
known names.300 Brand names give new products and services
legitimacy.301 In an environment where competition had not pre-
viously existed, consumers will flock to companies they know and
trust.302 Second, each of the companies must have the ability to
quickly secure a share of the local exchange market.303 Thus, the
more successful companies will be those with local networks al-
ready in place or the financial resources available to quickly ac-
cess or build those networks.304 Third, each of the companies must
possess tremendous wealth.305 Companies will require enormous
amounts of investment capital to maintain the technology necessary
to compete. The following sections briefly describes those companies
with the qualities necessary to dominate the local exchange market.
1.   AT&T
Shortly following the enactment of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, AT&T Chairman Robert Allen stated that the com-
pany expects to control at least thirty percent of the local ex-
change market within ten years.306 This prediction is certain to
prove true for a number of reasons. First, AT&T has the most ex-
tensive telecommunications network in the world.307 Through this
network, AT&T presently provides long-distance services to ap-
proximately sixty percent of the subscribers in the United
States.308 AT&T could quickly convert these subscribers to receive
its local exchange services as well. Second, the company is in-
credibly rich. In 1994, AT&T had over $70 billion in revenue, $6
billion in operating income, and $7 billion in cash flow.309 Thus,
AT&T can purchase everything it needs to effectively dominate
the local exchange market.310 Third, AT&T is ultra-competitive.311
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In anticipation of telecommunication deregulation, the company
laid off many employees for efficiency and invested billions of
dollars in state-of-the-art technologies.312 Fourth, AT&T quickly
positioned itself to compete for local exchange services in all fifty
states.313 As discussed above, once the negotiations for intercon-
nection and collocation conclude, AT&T will immediately begin to
provide local telephone services.314 To summarize AT&T’s position
following the recent reforms, “[u]nless it royally screws up, AT&T
is the only company that really can’t lose.”315
2.   Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, SBC Communications, and US West
The RBOCs clearly have the most to lose by deregulation of
the local exchange market. With scores of companies prepared to
provide local telephone services, the RBOCs, unfamiliar with the
art of competition, are certain to lose significant portions of their
once-monopolistic empires.316 However, for three primary reasons,
the larger and wealthier RBOCs—such as Bell Atlantic, Bell-
South, SBC Communications, and US West—will remain major
providers of local exchange services. First, the RBOCs almost ex-
clusively possess the most valuable assets of any of the telecom-
munications carriers: the local telephone networks. RBOC com-
petitors will need to either construct more comprehensive local
networks or access the RBOCs’ networks. As mentioned, con-
structing a local network is expensive, and access to the RBOCs’
networks will not occur without a prolonged and costly fight.317
Second, the local exchange markets are the RBOCs’ to lose. Al-
most every local telephone subscriber in the United States is a
customer of an RBOC.318 Many nervous consumers likely will pre-
fer to maintain the status quo and remain with their regional
telephone company rather than switch to a carrier that has never
before offered local telephone services. Third, the RBOCs are ex-
tremely wealthy. The regional telephone companies have a com-
bined annual revenue of over $95 billion,319 cash flow of over $32
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billion,320 and assets of over $200 billion.321 This money would be
well-spent by the RBOCs to rapidly update their antiquated cop-
per wire networks into more desirable advanced fiber-optic net-
works.
3.   TCI, Time Warner, and Comcast
The nation’s largest cable companies, such as TCI, Time War-
ner, and Comcast, possess three main advantages that will per-
mit them to compete with the telephone companies for local ex-
change subscribers. First, cable companies currently own more
technologically advanced wired networks than their competi-
tors.322 Compared to the telephone companies’ primitive copper
wire networks, coaxial cable and fiber-optic cable networks have
more desirable transmission capabilities.323 Second, approxi-
mately sixty percent of American households are currently wired
for cable television.324 With the addition of switching equipment,
cable companies will quickly possess the ability to compete in the
local exchange arena.325 Third, cable companies are wealthy, al-
beit not as wealthy as the RBOCs or major long-distance carriers.
The annual revenues of the cable companies are approximately
$24 billion, and their assets roughly total $50 billion.326 These
funds will be necessary to continue to build fiber-optic networks,
pay interconnection and collocation fees, and purchase advanced
switching equipment.
VII.   CONCLUSION
The recent telecommunications reforms will achieve the goal of
bringing competition to the local exchange market. No longer will
consumers be forced to receive antiquated local exchange services
from a single carrier. In the future, competing global supercarri-
ers will not only provide advanced local exchange services, but
also the full array of consumers’ telecommunications needs. Be-
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cause of the consolidation of the industry and the competitive ad-
vantages shared by the major telecommunications companies,
however, an era of effective oligopoly eventually will emerge, in
which a small number of supercarriers dominate each of the na-
tion’s telecommunications markets. Should this state of oligopoly
adversely impact consumers and the development of beneficial
technologies, Congress must again act. The nation’s telecommu-
nications laws must evolve with the telecommunications indus-
try. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 may well need to give
way to the Telecommunications Act of 2010.
